I. INTRODUCTION
In the unification of laws, as in most endeavors of international cooperation, willingness to compromise is a necessary requirement for success. 1 The preparation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), adopted in Vienna on 11 April 1980 and hailed today as "one of history's most successful efforts at the unification of . . . law governing international transactions," 2 was no exception: The drafters of the Convention had to reach compromises on a number of difficult questions in the area of sales and contract law, thereby bridging the gaps between different "legal families" (mainly Common Law and Civil Law), 3 different political systems (capitalist and socialist States, or "East and West") and States at different stages of economic development (developed and developing countries, or "North and South"). 
The Struggle for the Freedom of Form Principle
One of the most controversial issues had, from the very beginning, been the necessity of form requirements for the conclusion and modification of international sales contracts. 5 The question whether a certain form should be prescribed by the uniform sales law sat at more than one "fault line" dividing groups of States which followed very different legal concepts and traditions in this matter: First, and eventually most important, the then socialist countries under the leadership of the U.S.S.R. 1 insisted on formal requirements for the making of foreign trade contracts, while others (in particular Western market economies) rejected such requirements as impractical and inappropriate for international commercial transactions. The socialist approach reflected the needs of a "planned economy"
See Gyula Eörsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
6 which depended on written records of contract conclusions and modifications in order for the planning authorities to be able to match the sales transactions made by state enterprises to the government-made plan. For countries with a socialist planned economy, the emphasis was thus on security without surprises-even at the expense of otherwise desirable contracts not coming into being. 7 At the same time, there existed a second divide, namely between Common Law and Civil Law. It primarily resulted from two traditional Common Law concepts that had, to a varying degree, been maintained in some jurisdictions: 8 On one hand, the remainder of the English 1677 Statute of Frauds which, in a considerably restricted area, required (and even today requires 9 ) a written form for the enforcement of the contract, and on the other hand the doctrine of consideration which requires some countervalue for the enforcement of contractual promises and thus does not allow for purely informal contract modifications. The Civil Law countries, on the contrary, mostly accepted contract conclusions and modifications without any form being observed-those jurisdictions that maintained provisions in the tradition of Article 1341 of the French Civil Code (which excludes witness testimony as a means of proving a contract 10 ) did usually not apply them to commercial transactions. 7 Eörsi, supra note 4, at 341. 8 Id. at 346. 9 U.C.C. § 2-201 (2002) . 10 This rule applies today only to contracts with a value of more than 800 Euros. At the time of the Vienna Diplomatic Conference in 1980, however, the minimum value was still fixed at 50 French Francs.
11 On the law of some Latin American countries (Argentina, A Contracting State whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing may at any time make a declaration in accordance with article 12 that any provision of article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing, does not apply where any party has his place of business in that State. The effect of Article 96 reservations is furthermore spelled out in Article 12 CISG, which in substance is a repetition of Article 96 CISG: 14 Any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this Convention that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting State which has made a declaration under article 96 of this Convention. The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of this article.
In contrast to other compromises that became part of the Convention but are not easily recognizable as such, 15 the compromise on the scope of the informality principle is a clear and recognizable compromise, 16 since it has been cast in the form of a reservation in the sense of Article 2(1)(d) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 17 In the Sales Convention's practical application, however, this alone did unfortunately not result in Articles 12 and 96 CISG being an easy-to-apply rule: both scope and effect of the exception to the freedom of form proved difficult to determine for courts and arbitral tribunals, leading to divergent interpretations of these provisions and to significant uncertainty. 18 The resulting difficulties are particularly important since they concern the contract's formal validity, thus affecting the very existence and enforceability of the parties' contractual rights and obligations.
Against this background, the present article attempts to outline the most important questions that have arisen under the reservation to the CISG's freedom of form principle and suggests possible answers. use of the Article 96 reservation and reports recent developments in this area. Part IV then discusses a number of issues raised by the scope of Article 96 CISG. Parts V and VI focus on different aspects of the (possible) effects of an Article 96 reservation, referred to in the present article as its "negative" effect (Part V) and its "positive" effect (Part VI) respectively. Part VII deals with the determination of a sales contract's formal validity via rules of private international law in CISG cases, before Part VIII addresses the role of party autonomy within the scope of Articles 12 and 96 CISG. Part IX concludes.
II. DRAFTING HISTORY
The drafting history of Article 96 CISG and its companion provision, Article 12 CISG, was as such comparatively uneventful. Both provisions had no predecessor in the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts in the International Sale of Goods (ULF) or the Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) adopted in 1964. During the preparation of the CISG within UNCITRAL as well as during the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the discussions about a possible reservation on form requirements formed part and parcel of the more general policy discussion about the freedom of form principle under the Convention.
In UNCITRAL, a provision resembling Articles 12 and 96 CISG had been proposed by the U.S.S.R. as early as 1971, 19 since the country had legislation requiring contract terms to be expressed in a signed writing. After the general policy decision mentioned above, the U.S.S.R. continued to be the principal supporter of today's Article 96 reservation, 20 which in turn was viewed by the other States as essentially a price for the Convention's acceptance by the U.S.S.R. and other socialist States.
and 96 CISG receiving relatively little attention from the conference delegates, as there was agreement that the primary concern was the reservation's acceptability for the U.S.S.R.
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Certain substantive amendments to Article 96 CISG's language which were nevertheless proposed during the Conference will be addressed below where relevant for the interpretation of the provision.
A 
Developments in Treaty Practice
An Article 96 reservation may be made at "any time," that is, not only at the time of signature, ratification of, or accession to the Convention, but also at any subsequent time. 36 While there is hope that the recent developments in Latvia, China, and Lithuania may also result in other reservation States revisiting their position towards the Convention's freedom of form principle, 41 Articles 12 and 96 CISG will-at least for the time being-continue to affect the CISG's application in practice. It is therefore useful to discuss some of the interpretative issues that have arisen under these provisions.
IV. SCOPE OF THE RESERVATION

Prerequisites for Reservations Under Article 96 CISG
Article 96 CISG limits the making of declarations in accordance with Article 12 CISG to Contracting States whose legislation require all contracts of sale governed by the Convention to be concluded in or 38 was also understood as requiring that the domestic legislation imposes a form on all sales contracts.
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Accordingly, the legislation of a Contracting State must require all contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing in order to entitle him to make an Article 96 reservation. Of course, this prerequisite only refers to sales contracts potentially governed by the Convention; it is irrelevant whether contracts of sale which are outside the Convention's sphere of application-e.g., consumer contracts or sales of immovablesare subject to a form requirement or not. Against the background of the legislative history, the minority view among commentators which hold that Article 96 should not be read as imposing a particular threshold as to the required content and scope of domestic form legislation 49 fails to convince.
Lack of Prerequisites and Its Effect
With respect to some of the Contracting States that have made an Article 96 reservation, commentators have doubted whether the legal prerequisites for making the reservation were or are still fulfilled. Such doubts have been raised with a view to the Article 96 declarations by Argentina and by Chile, since neither the legislation in Argentina nor in Chile prescribes a mandatory written form for all sales contracts. 50 The same seems to be true for Paraguay. 51 The problem, however, is arguably more general in nature and extends beyond the examples referred to above. The reason is that all-encompassing writing requirements have become less and less common in domestic laws since the CISG was adopted in 1980, 55 and there is ground to believe that the legal prerequisites for Article 96 CISG reservations have also disappeared in other Article 96 reservation States-as in Belarus, Hungary, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, whose laws in force today all allow for an oral conclusion of sales contracts 56 -or will do so in the future. The possibility of Article 96 reservations having been made or maintained although the legal prerequisites for such reservation are lacking raises the question which effect such a constellation has for the Convention's practical application: Can (or must) courts refrain from observing such a declaration and accordingly apply the freedom of form principle enshrined in the Convention? The answer is in the negative: Article 97(4) CISG designates the only way by which a reservation's effect may be removed, i.e. through its withdrawal by a formal notification in writing addressed to the UN Secretary General in his role as depositary of the Convention (Article 89 CISG). The procedure prescribed by Article 97(4) CISG thus precludes courts in Contracting States from making their own and possibly divergent assessments about the compatibility of domestic laws with Article 96's prerequisites. Declarations that have been made under Article 96 must accordingly be observed by courts in Contracting States even if the prerequisites for such declaration were not or are no longer fulfilled, until the declaration has been formally withdrawn in accordance with Article 97 CISG. 57 The contrary approach, which holds that a reservation must be considered ineffective when its conditions are not 54 Article 10 of the Chinese Uniform Contract Law: "A contract may be made in writing, in an oral conversation, as well as in any other form." 55 See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 377 (discussing the "general move towards abolishing formal requirements."). 56 satisfied and should therefore be disregarded by the courts, 58 creates significant legal uncertainty and should not be followed.
Unclear Declarations
The exact scope of an Article 96 reservation (and, being determined by the scope, also the reservation's effect) is more difficult to assess where a Contracting State has made an unclear reservation, the wording of which does not exactly conform to the wording of Article 96 CISG. The declaration made by the People's Republic of China upon approval of the Convention was such a case. The Chinese declaration, in its relevant part, read as follows: "[t]he People's Republic of China does not consider itself bound by . . . article 11 as well as the provision of the Convention relating to the content of article 11."
The declaration by China resembled the declaration envisaged by Article 96 CISG, but its language was not as encompassing. In particular, it made no reference to Article 29 CISG, and could therefore raise doubts whether the People's Republic of China also intended to derogate from these provisions or rather wanted to leave them unchanged. The latter interpretation would have meant that the Chinese Article 96 reservation's effects would only have applied to contract conclusions, but not to contract modifications and terminations. 59 The interpretation of the unclear declaration made by China should be guided by Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in conjunction with Article 98 CISG: When read together, these two treaty provisions indicate that all reservations should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms used therein and thus, in the light of the object and purpose of Article 98 CISG, should be construed as invoking Articles 92-96 CISG (only) in accordance with the respective reservation's prerequisites and effect as laid down in 58 The making of an Article 96 reservation primarily serves to exclude the obligation under public international law to apply the Convention's freedom of form provisions that Contracting States would otherwise face. This basic effect of an Article 96 reservation stood at the center of the attention when the Convention was drafted, since some States-notably the U.S.S.R.-had made clear that they would not be able to adopt the Convention when such a step would make them treaty-bound to apply the principle of freedom of form. 63 The option to make a reservation-and this is sometimes overlooked today-was therefore first and foremost created with a view to removing the public international law obligation to respect the Convention's various freedom of form provisions, referred to in the present article as the Article 96 reservation's "negative" effect.
General
Where any party to a CISG sales contract has his place of business in a Contracting State that has made a declaration under Article 96, no Contracting State is under any obligation under public international law to 60 apply any provision of the Convention which provides for freedom of form (Article 12). According to the language of Article 12 first sentence and Article 96 CISG, this "negative" effect extends to "any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this Convention that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing." How far the effect reaches and by whom it has to be taken into account is nevertheless not immediately clear. These questions will be addressed below in an attempt to establish the exact scope of the reservation's "negative" effect. Its importance is two-fold. First, it determines which freedom of form provisions may be left unapplied to which declarations (and by courts respectively arbitral tribunals in which countries) without causing a breach of international treaty obligations arising from the CISG. Second, the "negative" effect's scope also influences what types of domestic form requirements may under which conditions be potentially applied to CISG contracts: 64 Beyond the reach of the reservation's "negative" effect, the Contracting States' obligation to apply the Convention's freedom of form provisions remains unaffected, and domestic form requirements accordingly remain pre-empted.
Contractual Declarations Affected
There is agreement that the effects of an Article 96 CISG reservation only extends to types of contractual declarations specifically mentioned in Articles 12 and 96 CISG, and not to others. 
Form Requirements Covered
A related interpretative issue concerns the types of form requirements covered by an Article 96 reservation's effect, which would normally be displaced by the Convention's informality principle but can now (at least potentially 69 ) be applied to CISG contracts. The language of Articles 12 and 96 CISG suggests that the effect of Article 96 reservations is limited to writing requirements, since these provisions derogate only from the provisions of the Convention that permit an agreement "in any form other than in writing." Other types of form requirements-as, e.g., legal provisions requiring a registration of sales contracts in a specified public 66 
Universal Effect in All Contracting States
The "negative" effect described applies in courts of all Contracting States, whether or not they have made a reservation under Article 96 CISG. 71 The making of an Article 96 reservation by one Contracting State, in other words, reduces not only its own, but all Contracting States' obligations to apply the Convention's freedom of form provisions. This is clearly expressed by the language of Articles 12 and 96 CISG, which connects the reservation's effect to the place of business of at least one of the parties to the sales contract in an Article 96 reservation State, and not to the location of the deciding court. The provisions' language furthermore frames their legal effect in a general manner ("any provision . . . does not apply"), thereby confirming that it applies independent of the location of the court in an ignores the wording of Articles 12 and 96 CISG as well as its legislative history and should not be followed.
"Negative" Effect in Courts of Non-Contracting States or in Arbitral Proceedings?
Since the "negative" effect of an Article 96 CISG declaration removes Contracting States' obligations under public international law to apply the CISG's freedom of form provisions, its application in courts of a given State presupposes that the forum State is subject to such an obligation in the first place. The effect does accordingly not apply in courts of NonContracting States, since they are at the outset under no obligation of any sort under public international law to take Articles 11 and 29 CISG into account. The same is true for arbitral tribunals, because the Convention neither creates any obligations for arbitral tribunals (whether their place of arbitration is located in a CISG Contracting State or not) 77 to the reservation's "negative" effect, but rather it's "positive" effect (if any) and/or to the applicable rules of private international law. It will accordingly be addressed below. 78 
VI. DETERMINATION OF THE RULES GOVERNING FORMAL VALIDITY (1):
"POSITIVE" EFFECT OF THE ARTICLE 96 RESERVATION?
The most difficult question concerning the effect of an Article 96 reservation is the following: Which law governs the formal validity of a CISG contract when one of the parties to that contract has his place of business in an Article 96 reservation State? In the Convention's practical application, this point is of significant importance, since the "negative" effect of an applicable Article 96 reservation alone does not enable a court or arbitral tribunal to assess whether a given sales contract has been validly concluded.
Two Schools of Thought
The first matter of dispute in this context is whether Articles 12 and 96 CISG themselves decide about the law governing the formal validity of a sales contract once their application is triggered, or whether this decision lies with the domestic rules of private international law. The question, when framed differently, is whether an Article 96 declaration does not only possess the "negative" effect previously discussed, 79 but in addition has a "positive" effect which determines the law that does apply in place of the Convention's freedom of form principle discarded by the declaration's "negative" effect. Neither Article 12 nor Article 96 CISG provides an obvious answer to this question. Case law and legal writings are divided between two schools of thought. One approach-characterized in both case law and legal writing as the "minority view," 80 although this label arguably says nothing about the merits of its underlying reasoning-considers the domestic form requirements of the Article 96 reservation State involved to be applicable. It has been followed in CIETAC arbitral awards 81 and a Russian arbitral award, 82 in court decisions from Belgium, 83 Russia 84 and the United States, 85 as well as by some commentators. 86 According to this approach, Articles 12, 96 CISG result in the universal applicability 87 of a reserving State's national law on formal requirements to every sales contract concluded by a party from this State. It thereby accords Article 96 reservations a "positive" effect.
Remarkably, none of the arbitral awards and court decisions cited above elaborates in any detail why they arrive at this interpretation of Article 96 CISG, 88 although it is not without interest to note that most of them were made by arbitrators or judges sitting in two Article 96 reservation States (Russia and China). 89 The approach's few supporters in literature argue that the delegates at the Vienna Conference accepted Articles 12, 96 CISG in order to enable the socialist countries to accept the Convention, 90 or make reference to the need, felt by some States, for protection against claims unsupported by a written agreement.
91 While these points invoke the commonly accepted historical background of the Article 96 reservation, they arguably fail to address the issue relevant here, namely whether a reservation that has been made under Article 96 merely respects domestic form requirements through its "negative" effect or goes (much) further by actively invoking their applicability.
b. The Majority Opinion: No "Positive" Effect
The opposite view is that Articles 12 and 96 CISG themselves do not address the question which law governs the formal validity of a sales contract-the legal effect of these CISG provisions is rather limited to excluding the Contracting State's obligation to respect the Convention's freedom of form principle. Whenever a Contracting State, by making a declaration under Article 96, has opted out of Articles 11 and 29 as well as Part II of the CISG, the Convention does not govern the question whether a breach-of-contract claim is sustainable in absence of a written contract. In such a situation, Article 7(2) CISG calls for the application of the rules of 87 See Schlechtriem & Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 20, art. 12, ¶ 2. 88 Note that for some of the decisions, only an abstract was available in a language accessible to the present author. 89 See Winship, supra note 12, at 3. 90 Reinhart, supra note 65, art. 12, ¶ 3. 91 HONNOLD, supra note 86, ¶ 129; Winship, supra note 12, at 9-11.
private international law of the forum, which therefore must determine the law governing the contract's formal validity. This view has been adopted by courts from Austria, 92 
Discussion
In the author's opinion, the majority view has it right, as will be demonstrated in more detail below. As a preliminary point, it is submitted that the existence, if any, of the reservation's "positive" effect is exclusively a matter of Article 12 and 96 CISG's interpretation in accordance with the rules governing such interpretation, and neither a question of the policies declaring and non-declaring States "implicitly" adopt when they become parties to the Convention 98 nor a question of comity. 99 The legal effect of reservations under the Sales Convention is not primarily affecting the governments of Contracting States, as it would be the case e.g. under treaties providing for the sale of minerals from one State to the other or for the temporal use of one State's territory by the other (traités contrats): Under treaties of this type, it may indeed be permissible and appropriate to have recourse to general considerations of intergovernment policy when determining the treaty obligations. Under a uniform private law convention like the CISG (a traité loi), 100 on the contrary, it is primarily the private parties to international sales contractsfrom reservation States, other Contracting States and Non-Contracting States alike-who are affected by the legal consequences of a reservation, because these consequences will influence the rules of private law governing their contracts (including, in case of Articles 12 and 96 CISG, their formal validity). This means, in turn, that the reservation's precise effect has to be established in accordance with the Convention's own rules on interpretation, as notably those deduced from Article 7(1) CISG. 101 The appropriate degree of comity and respect for reservation States' government policies is therefore the one uniformly laid done in Articles 12 and 96 CISG-no less and no more. The interpretation of these provisions below will show that a reservation against the freedom of form principle under the formal requirements binding on parties which trade with organizations in the declaring State."). But see Winship, supra note 12, at 9-11).
98 But see Winship, supra note 12, at 10. 99 But see Andersen, supra note 21, at 704. 100 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 88-92 (discussing the distinction between "treaty-contracts" (traités contrats) and "law-making" treaties (traités lois)). 101 See in detail SCHROETER, supra note 42, § 8, ¶ ¶ 23-33; Schroeter, supra note 28, at 427-28.
Sales Convention has no "positive" effect which would in itself determine the rules governing the formal validity of CISG contracts.
a. Language of Articles 12 and 96 CISG
Among the reasons supporting this "majority" approach, the first is the language of Articles 12 and 96 CISG: These provisions merely state that the Convention's freedom of form provisions do "not apply," rather than entitling a reserving State to declare that his own form requirements do apply. 102 Where the Convention wants to authorize a Contracting State to directly look to its "own law," it clearly says so, as demonstrated by Article 28 CISG. The fact that Articles 12 and 96 CISG do not contain a positive rule about the applicable form requirements was already noticed during the Diplomatic Conference, 103 but the provisions' wording was nevertheless left unchanged.
b. Legislative History of Article 96 CISG
The second reason lies in Article 96's legislative history. An alternative wording of Article 96 CISG which would have imposed the form requirements in a declaring State's domestic law also on other Contracting States 104 was discussed in UNCITRAL, but rejected. The reported ground for the rejection was that the proposal's adoption would have made the formal requirements of the law of the declaring State too widely applicable. 105 This decision made by the drafters of the Convention should be respected.
c. Purpose of the Reservation
The third reason pertains to the purpose of the Article 96 CISG reservation and its limits, as evident from the provision's drafting history. It has already been outlined above that the inclusion of the Article 96 CISG reservation into the Convention served the purpose to exclude the declaring States' obligation under public international law to apply the Convention's freedom of form provisions. 107 The reservation's "negative" effect fulfills this purpose. A "positive effect" of Article 96 CISG reservations, as suggested by the minority approach 108 rejected here, would go significantly further than that by making the application of the reservation State's domestic form requirements a rule in all situations governed by Article 96 CISG, i.e. whenever a CISG contract involves a party from the reservation State. It would be irrelevant whether the party from the reservation State is the buyer or the seller, where the contract was concluded or where it had to be performed, or whether any other factor commonly used in rules of private international law decisively connects the contract at hand to the reservation State-independent of such connecting factors, Article 96 CISG by itself would provide the domestic form requirements with an allencompassing sphere of application. Due to the reservation's universal effect, 109 the obligation to observe it would furthermore apply in courts of all Contracting States, which-being treaty-bound to apply Article 96 CISG with all the effects such a reservation has-would equally have to apply the reservation State's domestic form requirements. It is submitted that such an understanding clearly exceeds the provision's purpose.
d. Domestic Form Requirements as Internationally Mandatory Rules
The rejection of a "positive" effect of Article 96 CISG does as such not exclude the possibility for a State to impose a domestic writing requirement on all international contracts involving its nationals, as some States may theoretically be interested in doing. Such was apparently the position of the U.S.S.R.'s law as in force in 1980, which prescribed mandatory form requirements for all foreign trade transactions concluded by Soviet organizations. 110 The path towards such an internationally mandatory application of domestic form requirements, however, is not paved alone by declaration of an Article 96 reservation, but in addition requires the respective form provisions to qualify as "internationally mandatory rules" under the applicable rules of private international law.
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Such rules, which are also referred to as "overriding mandatory provisions" 112 or "règles d'application immediate," are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under the rules of private international law.
The application of internationally mandatory rules causes few difficulties if they form part of the lex fori, 113 internationally mandatory rules, but do not oblige them to do so. 115 This difference, again, indicates that a "positive" effect of Article 96 CISG would go beyond the accepted degree of comity for foreign mandatory rules.
e. Internationally Mandatory Rules Under Private International Law Conventions
The last point can be further illustrated by looking at uniform private international law conventions, 116 two of which were adopted in the 1980s, not long after adoption of the CISG. The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980 allowed courts in Contracting States of the Rome Convention to apply internationally mandatory rules of the lex fori, 117 but gave them discretion as far as the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules was concerned. 118 In addition, it provided Contracting States with the possibility to make a reservation even against the latter possibility, 119 thereby excluding any (although only discretionary) application of foreign internationally mandatory rules-an option that was used by a number of States. 120 A comparable philosophy was followed by the drafters of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 22 December 1986 which entitles any Contracting State to make a reservation that would enable him to continue to apply his own mandatory 115 A "positive" effect of Article 96 CISG reservations, on the contrary, would go significantly beyond the consistent approach in uniform private international law by making the application of reservation States' domestic form requirements mandatory in all CISG Contracting States, with no possibility for non-reserving States to exercise discretion or to make a reservation against this obligation. It is submitted that it is quite unlikely that the Convention's drafters intended to (implicitly!) impose such a farreaching obligation on Contracting States.
f. Contracts Between Two Parties from Different Reservation States
Finally, a specific difficulty arises under the "positive" effect approach that further demonstrates the weakness of its construction. It becomes apparent in situations in which a contract of sale has been concluded between two parties which both have their place of business in States that have each made a declaration under Article 96 CISG (examples: a sales contract between a Russian seller and a Hungarian buyer, or a sales contract between a seller from Chile and a buyer from Argentina): In cases as these-which should by no means be uncommon in practice, since the current Article 96 reservation States form two geographical "clusters" in Eastern Europe and South America respectively-it remains unclear which reservation State's law governs the formal validity of the contract, since neither Articles 12, 96 CISG nor the declarations authorized by these provisions address this question. Their failure to do so again accords with the limited purpose of Article 96 CISG, which is restricted to excluding the obligation to apply the freedom of form provisions mentioned in Article 96 (the reservation's "negative" effect): As far as rules on the contract's form are concerned, this reservation only removes, but does not provide.
Conclusion
In summary, it is the applicable rules of private international law which determine the law governing the formal validity of international sales contracts and the manner in which they may be evidenced whenever one of the parties to the contract has his place of business in an Article 96 reservation State.
VII. DETERMINATION OF THE RULES GOVERNING FORMAL VALIDITY (2):
APPLICATION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CISG CASES
Court Proceedings
As Articles 12 and 96 CISG, when read in accordance with the interpretation favored here, do not by themselves determine the rules governing the formal validity of the sales contract, one could be lead to believe that the courts are next required to look for general principles underlying the Convention as prescribed by Article 7(2) CISG. 123 It is submitted, however, that such an approach would be misguided in cases in with Articles 12 and 96 CISG apply, since the "negative" effect of those provisions means that the question at hand-the formal validity of sales contracts involving at least one party from an Article 96 reservation Stateis in those cases not governed by the Convention, and therefore does not constitute an "internal" gap in these cases. 124 A recourse to general principles on which the Convention is based-freedom of form (informality) being one of the principles frequently listed by courts and (5) the law of the place where the contract is performed (the lex loci solutionis). 133 Many national conflict of laws rules adopt similarly tolerant positions. 134 The prevailing approach in private international law accordingly aims at preventing a formal invalidity of sales contracts by letting the least stringent form requirements suffice. 135 As already mentioned above, 136 a different outcome may result from a domestic form requirement exceptionally qualifying as an "internationally mandatory provision," thereby demanding to be applied to a contract notwithstanding the general favor validitatis approach. It is, however, unlikely that form requirements for commercial sales contracts-like the contracts covered by the CISG 137 -will meet the prerequisites for an overriding mandatory provision, since their application would have to be "crucial" for a country's political, social or economic organization or its other public interests. Although these rather steep requirements were met by the Soviet law's writing requirements during the U.S.S.R.'s time as a planned economy, 138 the situation has arguably changed since then, with the few remaining form provisions for sales of movable goods hardly being regarded as crucial for a country's public interests but merely as traditional rules of (mostly) evidence. 139 And even in the unlikely event that a form requirement does qualify as an internationally mandatory provision, its actual application will only be guaranteed when it forms part of the lex fori, since conflict of laws rules mostly grant courts discretion as far as mandatory provisions of third States are concerned. 140 With the determination of the law governing formal validity being left to the rules of each forum, the outcome is not necessarily uniform, since the rules of private international law (and of evidence) are not. The case law on CISG contracts, however, nevertheless demonstrates some international uniformity in this matter: When conflict of laws rules declare the law of an Article 96 reservation State applicable, this usually is read as applicability of that State's domestic form requirements (often resulting in the contract's formal invalidity), 141 while the application of the law of a State that has not made an Article 96 reservation results in the application of the freedom of form principle. 142 
b. Role of the CISG's Freedom of Form Principle
In the latter case, an additional question arises: When rules of private international law call for the application of the law of a (non-reserving) CISG Contracting State, are the form requirements to be applied those of the domestic law of that State, or is it the freedom of form principle of Articles 11, 29(1) CISG? The question becomes practically relevant whenever the domestic law contains form requirements and would therefore lead to the formal invalidity of the sales contract, while an application of Articles 11 or 29(1) CISG would not.
The answer, it is submitted, cannot be derived from Articles 11, 12 or 96 CISG (the Convention, in other words, is silent about the matter), but is-again-exclusively a matter for the domestic private international law rules. 143 These rules will indeed lead to the application of Article 11 CISG if they follow the traditional conflict of laws goal to apply the law of each country as much as possible in the same manner as a judge in that country would apply the law: 144 As this judge would apply Article 11 CISG since his State has not made an Article 96 reservation, the foreign judge applying the law via private international law rules would do the same. 145 (It may be helpful to add that, for purposes of this assessment of the content of a NonArticle 96 CISG reservation State's law, the fact that the contract concerned also involves a party from an Article 96 reservation State-which lead to the application of Articles 12 and 96 CISG in the first place-is not to be taken into account a second time.) At least two Dutch courts (including the Supreme Court) have explicitly adopted the position taken here. 146 Authors supporting the contrary position 147 primarily refer to the language of Article 12 first sentence CISG ("Any provision of article 11 [. . .] does not apply . . . .") and argue that, because of its clear indication that the Convention's freedom of form principle can never apply where one party has his place of business in an Article 96 reservation State, the only form requirements that can be applied are those of domestic law. It is submitted that this approach misunderstands and, in doing so, overstates the provision's non-application statement, because Article 12's wording should does not apply. 159 This result can be derived from the language of Articles 6 and 12 CISG which limits the mandatory nature of Article 12 to party agreements that derogate from or vary the effect of individual CISG provisions. In addition, there is no room for the "negative" effect of a reservation under Articles 12 and 96 CISG where the parties have already excluded the freedom of form principle along with the rest of the Convention, and accordingly no need to safeguard it through Article 12 sentence 2 CISG.
IX. CONCLUSION
The incorporation of the freedom of form principle, allowing the parties to cross-border sales transactions to conclude and modify their contract without regard to any form, was an important policy decision when the UN Sales Convention (CISG) was adopted in 1980. It came, however, subject to a compromise, namely the reservation defined in Articles 12 and 96 CISG. The present article has outlined the difficulties that this reservation has generated in practice, and has discussed the numerous disputes it has caused in case law and legal writing.
In hindsight, the use of a reservation as a legal technique to accommodate a diplomatic compromise has proven troublesome, since it lacks the flexibility necessary to adapt to subsequent political and legal changes: Although many of the domestic form requirements that the Article 96 CISG reservation initially preserved have since been abolished, the declarations made under this provision mostly remain in force. Until they have been comprehensively withdrawn, the cross-border freedom of form principle will therefore remain "under reservation," providing a sufficient reason to continue the search for an internationally uniform and practically suitable interpretation of Articles 12 and 96 CISG.
